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DECONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Kevin Jon Heller*
By Mark A. Drumbl.
New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 298. Cloth, $80;
paper, $29.99.
ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

INTRODUCTION

After nearly fifty years of post-Nuremberg hibernation, international
criminal tribunals have returned to the world stage with a vengeance. The
Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") in 1994. Hybrid domestic-international tribunals have
been established in Sierra Leone (2000), East Timor (2000), Kosovo (2000),
Cambodia (2003), Bosnia (2005), and Lebanon (2007). And, of course, the
international community's dream of a permanent tribunal was finally realized in 2002, when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC") entered into force.2
This unprecedented proliferation of international criminal tribunals reflects the world community's deep-seated faith in the ability of trials to heal
the wounds caused by mass atrocity. The Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY claimed that an international tribunal "would contribute to
the restoration and maintenance of peace."3 The ICTR Statute states that the
prosecution of those responsible for genocide in Rwanda would "contribute
to the process of national reconciliation" and help ensure "that such violations are halted and effectively redressed. ' 4 Not to be outdone, the Rome
Statute confidently links criminal prosecutions to the "peace, security and
well-being of the world."5
If anything, the human rights community is even more optimistic about
the transformative potential of criminal trials, often insisting that international
*

Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland Faculty of Law.

I.

See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38

CORNELL INT'L L.J. 837, 852 (2005) ("For about a half century, the postwar trials ... would remain

solitary precedents in international criminal adjudication.").
2. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3.

S.C. Res. 808, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).

4.

ICTR Statute, S.C. Res. 955, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).

5.

Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
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trials are "the single most appropriate response to communal violence ' 6 and
"the centerpiece of social repair."7 Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say
that "the quest for 'justice' [has] displaced the traditional
pursuit for 'truth'
' 8
as the rallying cry for the human rights movement.
In Atrocity, Punishment, and InternationalLaw, Mark Drumbl 9 categorically rejects this kind of unbridled faith in international criminal law. First,
he believes that "[a] proliferation of adversarial and individualized criminal
law does not inevitably lead to enhanced effectiveness in sanctioning or deterring atrocity" (p. xii). And second, he argues that a preference for
international trials has "prompted a shortfall with regard to the consideration
and deployment of other legal, regulatory, and transformative mechanisms
in the quest for justice" (p. 5). Drumbl thus insists that international criminal
law needs to be pluralized both vertically and horizontally: vertically, by
requiring tribunals to defer more readily to national and local transitionaljustice institutions; and horizontally, by encouraging national and local authorities to rely more heavily on nonpunitive accountability mechanisms,'
whether legal (such as civil sanctions) or nonlegal (such as truth commissions) (p. 18).
One paragraph is obviously insufficient to capture the complexity of
Drumbl's argument. Part I thus explores his deconstruction of the transformative potential of international trials and his proposed reconstitution of
international criminal law at greater length. Part II then argues that although
Drumbl's critique is both compelling and persuasive, his reconstitution is
likely to be less effective-and less just-than he believes.
I.

DRUMBL'S ARGUMENT

A. The Limits of Individual Criminal Responsibility
Drumbl's argument unfolds from the undeniable premise that the collective nature of "extraordinary international crimes"-genocide and crimes
against humanity in particular-distinguishes them from "ordinary domestic
crimes" (p. 11). Three differences stand out.
First, whereas ordinary domestic crimes normally affect a small number
of victims targeted indiscriminately," extraordinary international crimes
involve large numbers of victims who are specifically targeted because they
are members of a disfavored group (p. 4). The gravamen of genocide is the
6.
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTS. Q. 573, 578 (2002).

7.

Id.

8.

Id. at 575 n.4.
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11.
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"intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such."" And ordinary crimes like murder and rape only become
crimes against humanity when committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack" on a civilian population."
Second, ordinary domestic crimes are usually committed either by individuals or by small groups of perpetrators whose culpability is relatively
equal. Extraordinary international crimes, by contrast, are normally committed by large groups of perpetrators whose culpability differs substantially
(p. 25). At the top of the pyramid are the conflict entrepreneurs, the individuals who "exacerbate discriminatory divisions, which they then
commandeer" (p. 25). Next are the mid-level officials who, "while exercising authority over others and often ordering killings, themselves remain
subject to authority and, accordingly, are ordered into ordering others"
(p. 25). Below the mid-level leaders are the actual killers, "most of whom
are ordinary folks" (p. 25). And finally, there are the bystanders, "those multitudes who comply with the violence, who acquiesce in it, or who idle
while it unfolds around them" (p. 25). These groups, in Drumbl's opinion,
"represent descending levels of blameworthiness for atrocity"-although all
are necessary for atrocity to occur (p. 25).
Third, and finally, "whereas ordinary crime tends to be deviant in the
times and places it is committed, the extraordinary acts of individual criminality that collectively lead to mass atrocity are not so deviant in the times
and places where they are committed" (p. 8). Murder, torture, and rape are
prohibited regardless of whether a country is at peace or suffering mass
atrocity. Yet the state's willingness to punish such acts and the populace's
willingness to condemn them as immoral differs significantly depending on
the context. In times of peace, both punishment and condemnation are the
norm, isolating the perpetrator and branding his act as deviant. In times of
atrocity, the state not only encourages the perpetrator's act; similar acts are
committed by large swaths of the population (p. 33). The peacetime relationship between norm and transgression is thus inverted: "[t]hose who
commit extraordinary international crimes [are] the ones conforming to social norms," while "those who refuse to commit the crimes choose to act
transgressively" (p. 30).
Given these differences, we would expect international criminal law to
be specifically attuned to the collective nature of mass atrocity. The opposite
is actually true: "despite the proclaimed extraordinary nature of atrocity
crime, its modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and process of determining guilt or innocence, each remain disappointingly, although perhaps
reassuringly, ordinary" (p. 6). Drumbl is referring here to what he calls the
"liberal legalist" criminal trial-a trial in which "[a]ccountability determinations proceed through adversarial third-party adjudication, conducted in
judicialized settings, and premised on a construction of the individual as the

12.

E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.

13.

Id. art. 7(1).

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 106:975

central unit of action" (p. 5). Long a mainstay of domestic Western criminal
law, such trials are now the idiom of international criminal law, as well.
In Drumbl's view, international criminal law's embrace of the forms of
ordinary criminal law is deeply problematic. First, he believes that liberallegalist trials of extraordinary international criminals are incapable of addressing the complicity of bystanders, states, and international organizations
in mass atrocity. And second, he believes that such trials are unlikely to realize the basic penological goals of ordinary criminal law-retribution and
deterrence.
1. The Web of Complicity

As noted earlier, mass atrocity can only occur with the participation of
four discrete groups of perpetrators: conflict entrepreneurs, mid-level officials, actual killers, and bystanders. The first three groups are subject to
prosecution-the actual killers for committing the atrocities, the mid-level
officials and conflict entrepreneurs for commanding or abetting them. Bystanders, by contrast, are essentially immune from prosecution: It is simply
not criminal for someone to "draw their blinds and look away" as innocents
are slaughtered (p. 25). It is not even criminal for someone to benefit indirectly from atrocity-the Hutu who sees the slaughter of Tutsis as a source
or ethnic pride, the German who moves into a luxurious apartment previously occupied by a Jew deported to Auschwitz. There is thus a dangerous
lacuna at the heart of international criminal law.
Nor is that the only lacuna. International criminal law's focus on individual guilt also "pulls our gaze away from the many other actors involved
in the tapestry of atrocity-including malfeasant, complicit, or distracted
states and their officials, along with decisionmakers in international organizations" (p. 173). The severity of the Rwandan genocide could have been
significantly reduced had the UN heeded the desperate warnings of its head
peacekeeper that the atrocities were about to occur (p. 137). Similarly, a
strong case can be made that the ICTY was created to atone for the world
community's failure to intervene in the former Yugoslavia.14 International
criminal law is powerless, however, to punish such unconscionable failures
of political will-thereby increasing the likelihood that they will not be the
last ones.
2. PenologicalRationales

Drumbl also questions the utility of international criminal law within its
narrow band of responsibility. In his view, liberal-legalist trials of extraordinary international criminals are unlikely to promote either retribution or
deterrence, the traditional rationales for punishment.

14.

See, e.g.,

GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF

WAR CRIMES TIBUNALS 207 (2000).
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a. Retribution
Drumbl identifies three limitations on the retributive value of international criminal law. First, given the seriousness of atrocity crimes-often
involving hundreds or thousands of murders-an adequate retributive punishment might require "torture or reciprocal group eliminationism" of those
who perpetrate it (p. 157). Such punishments are not only prohibited by international human rights standards, they are also morally unthinkable-"[i]n
such a scenario, survivors would become as depraved as their tormentors"
(p. 157).
Second, even if "ordinary" criminal sentences could be retributively
adequate, international tribunals do not actually impose them. No international tribunal since Nuremberg has permitted the death penalty, and judges
have shown little inclination to impose life sentences on individuals responsible for mass atrocity. Indeed, as Drumbl's extensive research indicates,
sentences for extraordinary international crimes are generally no longer than
sentences imposed by domestic courts for serious ordinary crimes-and
sometimes are even shorter (p. 154). Consider the median sentences imposed by the international tribunals: the ICTY, twelve years; the ICTR,
fifteen years; the East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes ("SPSC"),
eight years (pp. 57-58). Seven ICTR defendants have received final sentences of life imprisonment, but no ICTY defendant has ever received such a
sentence-and life imprisonment was not even an option for the SPSC.
b. Deterrence
Drumbl is also skeptical of international criminal law's ability to deter
mass atrocity. In his view, the deterrent value of punishment is a function of
two factors: the likelihood that a perpetrator will be prosecuted, and how
quickly the perpetrator will be punished once captured. 5 If perpetrators are
captured, the "promptness" factor is relatively unproblematic, because international prosecutions rarely result in acquittals: to date, for example, the
ICTY has acquitted five of forty-one 7defendants, 6 while the ICTR has acquitted five of thirty-three defendants.
The likelihood that a particular perpetrator will be prosecuted, by contrast, is almost nonexistent. Because of financial and manpower limitations,
international tribunals prosecute very few perpetrators, particularly relative
to the number of perpetrators involved in mass atrocity (p. 151). Moreover,
because they do not have their own police forces, the tribunals are dependent on national governments to capture perpetrators-governments that may
well reject their legitimacy, like Serbia and the ICTY. As a result, there is a
15. P. 170. Drumbl actually discusses the likelihood of capture, but the two concepts are
interchangeable-a perpetrator obviously cannot be prosecuted if he cannot be captured.
16. Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings, http://www.un.orglicty/glance/procfact-e.htm
visited Nov. 23, 2007).

(last

17. Status of ICTR Detainees, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm
visited Nov. 23, 2007).

(last
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"very low chance that offenders ever are accused or, if accused, that they
ever are taken into the custody of criminal justice institutions," crippling the
deterrent value of international prosecutions (p. 169).
Drumbl acknowledges the obvious rejoinder to his critique: if the problem is that international tribunals cannot conduct enough prosecutions, why
not simply create more tribunals and fund them better? He responds with a
far more radical claim: namely, that it is not clear whether the perpetrators
of mass atrocity are even capable of being deterred by the threat of punishment. The deterrence value of prosecution assumes that perpetrators are
rational-that they have the ability to weigh the likelihood of punishment
against the expected rewards of criminal activity. It is questionable, however, whether the perpetrators of mass atrocity possess such rationality. "Do
genocidal fanatics, industrialized into well-oiled machineries of death, make
cost-benefit analyses prior to beginning work?" (p. 171). In Drumbl's opinion, the answer is no.
B. Reconstituting InternationalCriminalLaw

For Drumbl, in short, international criminal trials have two fundamental
limitations: they cannot reach bystanders, states, and international organizations, all of whom play a necessary role in the perpetration of mass atrocity;
and they have minimal retributive and deterrent value. Those limitations do
not make such trials superfluous; Drumbl readily admits that "[t]here is
some room for adversarial criminal trials within the justice matrix" (p. 21).
But they do indicate that international criminal law needs to be pluralized
both vertically and horizontally.
1. Vertical Pluralization

It's bad enough, in Drumbl's view, that international criminal law cannot
adequately address the collective nature of mass atrocity. Even worse is the
fact that international tribunals put downward pressure on domestic criminal
institutions to mimic their failed norms, procedures, and sanctions (p. 123).
ICTR and ICTY referrals are a perfect example: although the tribunals are
given primary responsibility for prosecuting extraordinary international
criminals within their territorial jurisdictions, they retain the right to refer
specific cases to domestic courts-something national governments fervently desire.' s That right, however, comes with two critical limitations: the
tribunals can only refer a case if they are satisfied that a defendant will be
given a fair trial and if a convicted defendant will not receive the death penalty. "The effect of this process is to induce national courts that seek
jurisdiction to conform to a variety of modalities that mimic those found in
international criminal law regarding sanction (i.e., no death penalty) and

18. See, e.g., Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda: The Judges of the ICTR Invite Kigali to
Prove Its Capacity to Try One of Their Accused, ALLAFRICA.COM, Sept. 28, 2007, http://
allafrica.com/stories/200709290171 .html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
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procedure (i.e., a fair trial)" (p. 139). Rwanda, for example, recently eliminated the death penalty so it could receive ICTR referrals.' 9
The ICC's complementarity principle has a similarly homogenizing effect. Although complementarity gives domestic courts the initial opportunity
to investigate and prosecute cases, that right is conditioned on the domestic
court not being "unwilling" or "unable" to do so effectively-a determination made by the ICC itself. As a result, "the more a national legal process
approximates that of the ICC, including its specific trial and sanctioning
modalities, the greater the likelihood that this process will be palatable and
pass muster" (p. 143). Indeed, complementarity may even prohibit states
from using nonpunitive accountability mechanisms like truth commissions
and civil reparations (p. 142).
The problem, of course, is that the balance of power between international tribunals and domestic courts is too heavily weighted toward the
tribunals. Drumbl thus suggests that primacy and complementarity be replaced by what he calls the principle of qualified deference: "a rebuttable
presumption in favor of local or national institutions that, unlike complementarity, does not search for procedural compatibility between their
process and liberal criminal law and, unlike primacy, does not explicitly
impose liberal criminal procedure" (p. 188). According to qualified deference, a national or local transitional-justice institution would be allowed to
operate as long as it did not grossly deviate from a number of interpretive
guidelines, including good faith, democratic legitimacy, and the preclusion
of the infliction of great evils on others (p. 189).
2. Horizontal Pluralization
Qualified deference would obviously give national and local authorities
a significant amount of freedom to experiment with nonpunitive sanctions
for mass atrocity. And that, for Drumbl, is precisely the point: given the failure of criminal prosecutions to remedy or deter mass atrocity, new and
different sanctions-sanctions that "acknowledge the group-based nature of
atrocity"-are needed (p. 194). Some possible sanctions have already been
tried, including lustration (limiting the political participation of perpetrators), legislative reparations, and state responsibility. Drumbl suggests that
these sanctions could be more broadly integrated into the transitional-justice
project (p. 196). Other sanctions that hold promise, however, have never
been used to address mass atrocity, such as civil remedies based in tort, contract law, and the law of restitution (p. 195).
Drumbl acknowledges that these group-based sanctions raise the unsettling specter of collective guilt-the idea that individuals can be punished
for acts committed by groups in which they are members, regardless of their
personal responsibility for those acts (p. 197). Nevertheless, he believes that

19. See Petter Clottey, Rwanda's Senate Votes to Abolish Death Penalty, NEWSVOA.coM,
July 12, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-07/2007-07-12-voa2.cfm (last visited
Nov. 23, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 15645964.
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his proposals for horizontal pluralization are actually based on the quite different idea of collective responsibility: "Whereas many individuals are
responsible for atrocity, a much smaller number are criminally guilty....
Civil liability implicates those individuals and institutions found to bear
some responsibility for discrimination-based mass atrocity. This can be a
large group, hence the recourse to the phrase collective responsibility"
(p. 197).
He also insists that nonpunitive collective sanctions would be both more
retributively just than criminal punishment and far more likely to deter future atrocities. They would be more retributively just because they would
permit "more carefully calibrated measurements of degrees of responsibility" and offer "a more textured understanding of the key roles played by
many otherwise neglected actors" (p. 195). And they would be more likely
to deter because the threat of sanction would not only encourage bystanders
to control conflict entrepreneurs early on, before they are able to "inflame
and exacerbate communal tensions" to the point of violence, but would also
put foreign states and international institutions on notice that their failure to
prevent mass atrocity will have consequences (p. 202).

II.

THE CRITIQUE

Atrocity, Punishment, and InternationalLaw is a challenging and provocative book. No transitional-justice scholar to date has so convincingly
critiqued the transformative potential of international criminal law. Indeed,
it is difficult to disagree with Drumbl's relentless insistence that the individualist liberal-legalism of international trials makes them singularly illequipped to address the collective nature of mass atrocity.
Drumbl's deconstruction of international criminal law, however, is more
persuasive than his reconstitution of it. In my view, his proposals for the
vertical and horizontal pluralization of international criminal law are both
problematic.
A. Vertical Pluralization
There are, I would suggest, three basic problems with Drumbl's proposals for vertical pluralization. First, very few national or local transitionaljustice institutions will satisfy the requirements for qualified deference, particularly good faith, democratic legitimacy, and the prohibition on inflicting
great evil. Second, in the wrong hands, the "great evil" guideline is likely to
devolve into little more than a modern-day repugnancy clause, imposing
Western values on those who knowingly and consensually reject them.
Third, it is unclear why it should never be acceptable to tolerate a "great
evil" in the name of peace.
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1. How Deferential Is Qualified Deference?
As noted earlier, Drumbl believes that a "rebuttable presumption in favor
of local or national institutions" would encourage national legal systems to
experiment with nonpunitive sanctions that may remedy and deter mass
atrocity better than international criminal trials (p. 188). There is no question that such "qualified deference" would be more deferential than either
primacy or complementarity (p. 187). But how much more is debatable,
given that Drumbl says a "gross failure on the part of the measure to meet
one of the guidelines could suffice to reverse the presumption" (pp. 18990). If recent and current transitional-justice institutions are any indication,
nearly all such institutions would run afoul of at least one interpretive guideline, rebutting the presumption of deference.
a. Good Faith
A number of transitional-justice institutions would violate the "good
faith" guideline, which asks whether a particular institution "express[es] or
display[s] sufficiently good motives on the part of the legislators" (p. 190).
Consider Rwanda's gacaca courts, Drumbl's primary example of an institution that he believes exhibits sufficient "good faith" to deserve deference.
Although the Rwandan government claims that the gacaca courts are designed to promote social reconciliation, 20 the courts actually "have more to
do with consolidating [the government's] own political power.' ' 2 First, the
Rwandan government amended the Organic Law in 2004 to remove war
crimes from the gacaca courts' jurisdiction, thereby preventing them from
hearing cases involving genocide-era crimes committed by soldiers and officials of the now-ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF").22 Second, although
the Rwandan government has still not found the motivation to create the
compensation fund called for in the 1996 and 2001 Organic Laws, it wasted
little time in legislating its own immunity from civil liability. 23 Third, as
popular participation in gacaca proceedings has declined, the Rwandan
government has increasingly resorted to using its armed security forces to
coerce individuals to attend . 24 Needless to say, these are not the actions of a
government acting in good faith.

20.

See Olivia Lin, Demythologizing Restorative Justice: South Africa's Truth and Recon-

ciliation Commission and Rwanda's Gacaca Courts in Context, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 41,

78-79 (2005).
21.
Radha Webley, Gacaca and Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda 10 (Jan. 29, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
22.

Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional

Justice, 79 TEMp. L. REV. 1,61 (2006).

23.

Id. at 56-57.

24. E.g., Lin, supra note 20, at 84 ("[Alt weekly gacaca meetings, armed security forces are
often present, and coerced participation is a relatively frequent trend." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Waldorf, supra note 22, at 67 ("Low participation rates have forced the state to employ
coercion, thus publicly exposing gacaca'sunpopularity and the contradictions in the state's ideology
of national unity and reconciliation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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We should not be surprised that the Rwandan government has used
gacaca as a "tool of social control"-Drumbl's own description (p. 95)instead of as a way to promote reconciliation. No matter how lofty their
rhetoric, official state institutions imposed top-down on populations torn
apart by atrocity will only be as progressive as the governments that create
them. And the Rwandan government is anything but progressive: as summarized by Villia Jefremovas, the RPF has simply "reproduced the pattern of
clientalism, political exclusion, double language, and corruption of the previous regimes, acting with the same brutal disregard for the needs of the
majority of the population as the previous regimes."25
Gacaca, of course, is not the only national transitional-justice institution
that would likely run afoul of the "good faith" guideline. South Africa's
much-heralded Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") is another
plausible candidate. Although the TRC's primary goal was to maintain political stability by awarding amnesty," the government's public rhetoric was
carefully designed to-conceal that fact:
Politically, the individuals who were involved in the TRCs [sic] development amplified its construction as an ideological formula rather than its
original position as a "primarily formal measure in [the] overall political
settlement." .. . The public hearings, in particular, re-framed the TRC as

less an agent for political transition and rather, an agent for spiritual rehabilitation.27
This gap between rhetoric and practice was no accident. The government was fully aware that the overwhelming majority of South Africans
opposed giving amnesty to those who defended apartheid through violence.2' The good faith solution would thus have been for the government to
make its case for amnesty through open democratic dialogue. But it did not,
preferring instead to downplay the realpolitikbehind the TRC through misleading slogans like "Reconciliation through truth."29 Even worse, the
government conveniently used the TRC's amnesty provisions to prevent
victims of apartheid from obtaining civil damage awards against the state.3 °

25.
RWANDA

VILLIA JEFREMOVAS, BRICKYARDS TO GRAVEYARDS: FROM PRODUCTION TO GENOCIDE IN

124 (2002).

26. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
8 (2001) ("The central meaning of 'reconciliation' was an amnesty law, rather than the later formulations advanced by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.").
27.

Lin, supra note 20, at 63-64 (second alteration in original).

28.

WILSON,

supra note 26, at 25.

29. See Franqois Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": the South African Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transitions to Democracy, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS IN
RECONCILIATION 91,92-93 (Emilios Christodoulidis & Scott Veitch eds., 2001).
30. WILSON, supra note 26, at 24 ("[l~f a former agent of the government was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Committee, then the state [was] also automatically indemnified for
damages.").
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That indemnification was the height of bad faith, given that the government
knew most South Africans preferred the right to sue to forgiveness.3'
b. DemocraticLegitimacy
Gacaca and South Africa's TRC would also likely violate the "democratic legitimacy" guideline, which asks whether a particular transitionaljustice institution enjoys "a substantive form of social legitimacy" (p. 190).
The troubled history of gacaca is a perfect example. Rwandan citizens initially supported the gacaca system,32 despite the fact that the government
created it following a "sensitization campaign" that was "too short and too
top-down, with little or no room for a frank and open popular discussion."33
That support, however, has all but disappeared 34 as a result of the system's
endemic corruption, the thousands of gacaca judges suspected of involvement in the genocide, and the Rwandan government's heavy-handed and
partisan decision to exempt RPF crimes from gacaca's jurisdiction.35 Indeed, the government's response to declining public participation reveals its
recognition that the gacaca courts are now widely seen as illegitimate: as
noted earlier, instead of trying to address the system's problems, the government has increasingly resorted to compelling participation in gacaca
proceedings through armed force. 36
Similar criticisms apply to South Africa's TRC. Although its amnesty
provisions were critical to the country's political reconciliation,37 there is
little question that the TRC failed to achieve substantial social legitimacy.
As noted above, few South Africans supported amnesty for those who used
violence to protect apartheid, and even fewer believed that "national unity"
justified extinguishing
• 38 their right to sue for civil damages in exchange for
token compensation. It thus comes as little surprise that local people generally viewed the TRC as "weak, ineffectual and as a 'sell-out.' ,,3 In fact,
most South Africans rejected the idea that the TRC even promoted reconciliation; a national poll conducted in 1998 found that nearly two-thirds

31.
32.
(2007).

See id. at 24-25.
Christopher J. Le Mon, Rwanda's Troubled Gacaca Courts, 14 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 17

33. Filip Reyntjens & Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: An Atypical Transition, in ROADS TO RECONCILIATION 101, 119 (Elin Skaar et al. eds., 2005).
34. See, e.g., id. (noting there was "a fairly large participation of the population" initially in
gacaca proceedings, but now "the participation of the population is much more reduced and in many
cases, silence prevails").
35.

See Le Mon, supra note 32, at 16-18.

36.

See supra note 24.

37.

See

WILSON,

supra note 26, at 27.

38. See id. at 22 ("The TRC made it clear that victims should expect little from the process
and only a fraction of what they might have expected had they prosecuted for damages through the
courts.").
39.

id. at 200.
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believed that the TRC simply made South Africans angrier and caused relations between the races to deteriorate. 0
As we will see later, one reason the TRC failed to achieve social legitimacy was its open hostility toward traditional South African legal
institutions, such as the neighborhood courts known as imbizo. It is important to note here, however, that relying on traditional institutions in no way
guarantees that a state-sponsored transitional-justice program will be seen as
socially legitimate. The current situation in Uganda is a case in point. Faced
with the suddenly unpleasant prospect of ICC prosecutions,4 ' the Ugandan
government negotiated an agreement with the Lord's Resistance Army
("LRA") in June 2007 that claims national reconciliation can be better
achieved through traditional mechanisms like mato oput-a reintegration
ceremony that is part of the Acholi legal system, ker kwaro Acholi-than
42
through international trials. That may be the case, but there is reason for
skepticism: although equally distrustful of the ICC,43 a majority of Acholi
chiefs believe that it would not be possible to adapt mato oput for use on a
national scale, given the scope and scale of the present conflict. 4 Nor are the
Acholi chiefs alone: a recent study by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found that individuals throughout Uganda do not believe that
the use of traditional practices will lead to peace and reconciliation over the
long term and insist that they would be inappropriate for all but the lowestlevel perpetrators.4'5 Given such widespread skepticism, it seems reasonable
to conclude that a government-sponsored transitional-justice program based
on mato oput would not be seen by ordinary Ugandans as socially legitimate.
c. GreatEvil

Finally, Drumbl's "great evil" interpretive guideline would also disqualify a wide variety of transitional-justice institutions-especially those that
are based on traditional practices. This guideline establishes limits on the
kinds of punishment that can be imposed on perpetrators or third parties:
40.

See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 156 (2001).

41.
It was, after all, the Ugandan government that initially referred the situation in Northern
Uganda to the Court. See Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda:On a Collision Course with Incoherence?,J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL., Fall
2006, at 25, 35-36.
42. See Julius Ocen, Inst. for War & Peace Reporting, Can Traditional Rituals Bring Justice
to Northern Uganda? (July 25, 2007), http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=337405&apc-state=henh (last
visited Nov. 23, 2007).
43.

See Liu INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, Roco WAT I AcOLI: RESTORING RELATIONSHIPS IN
ii (2005), available at

ACHOLI-LAND: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND REINTEGRATION

http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/JRP/I 5Sept2005_Roco Wat I Acoli.pdf.
44.

Id. at 66.

45. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Making Peace Our Own:
Victims' Perceptionsof Accountability, Reconciliation, and TransitionalJustice in Northern Uganda
53-54 (Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/northem-Ugandaaugust2007.pdf.

April 2008]

Deconstructing InternationalCriminal Law

987

"[p]unishment cannot take the form of what cosmopolitan values condemn
as a great evil" (p. 191).
It would be easier to assess the "great evil" guideline if Drumbl told us
what kinds of punishments he believes qualify as great evils. Unfortunately,
he mentions only one: "sexual violence and terror" against women. That
great evil appears in his discussion of why Pashtunwali,the tribal law of the
Pashtun in Afghanistan, would not be entitled to qualified deference
(p. 192). Like many traditional justice systems, Pashtunwali remedies violent acts by asking the family of the abuser to compensate the family of the
abused, normally through the transfer of money or livestock. The problem,
for Drumbl, is that compensation can include the transfer of young girls or
women, as well:
So long as one of the sanctions contemplated by the Pashtunwali(even if
only in extremis)-namely, the transfer of young girls or women from the
family of the human rights abuser to the family of the abused in order to
restore the harm-remained operative, the Pashtunwaliwould not be entitled to qualified deference ... because sanction would impose a new great
evil, namely sexual violence and terror .... (p. 192)
It is easy to sympathize with Drumbl's position. But the "sexual violence and terror" of women is intrinsic to many traditional legal systems,
including ones that have played a central role in successful transitionaljustice institutions. East Timor's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
("CAVR"), for example, is widely credited as being more successful than
the TRCs in South Africa or Sierra Leone at reintegrating perpetrators into
their communities and promoting reconciliation. 46 CAVR's success was due,
in large part, to its innovative Community Reconciliation Process ("CRP")
hearings, which relied heavily on nahe biti boot, a dispute-resolution
mechanism that is part of lisan, East Timor's traditional customary law. 47 A
staggering ninety-six percent of CRP participants interviewed by CAVR
"said that the CRP had achieved its primary goal of promoting reconcilia48
tion in their community."
Despite its success as a restorative mechanism, however, lisan-based
CRP hearings would not be entitled to qualified deference. Lisan, no less
than Pashtunwali, subjects women to "great evils." There is almost no distinction in lisan between rape and adultery. Refusing to marry a woman
after consensual intercourse is considered more serious than violent rape.
Men who rape women are often required to marry the victim. 49 All in all,
"the compensation negotiations associated with the resolution of rape (and

46.

E.g., Waldorf, supra note 22, at 24.

47.

Id. at 25.

48. Comm'n for Reception, Truth & Reconciliation in East Timor, Chega!, pt. 9, T 118 (Oct.
31, 2005), available at http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html [hereinafter CAVR Report].
49. Laura Grenfell, Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in 17mor Leste, 19 LEIDEN J.
L. 305, 321 (2006).
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adultery) cases make the crime itself appear like a property offence and
women appear as cattle."5 °
To be sure, the CRP hearings did not involve the most patriarchal asoffenses.5'
pects of lisan, because CRP did not have jurisdiction over 1sexual
2
Moreover, although women participate minimally in lisan, women participated far more in the CRP panels.53 It could be argued, therefore, that the
CRP hearings would have been entitled to qualified deference despite the fact
that they relied on a traditional practice that would itself qualify as a great
evil. Unfortunately, that argument ignores the fact that the CRP's use of a
nonpatriarchal lisan ultimately strengthened traditional lisan and thus increased the likelihood that it would subject women to great evils. Indonesia
made a conscious decision to undermine lisan after it invaded East Timor,
recognizing its importance to the Timorese. Any "success" Indonesia might
have had, however, was quickly undone by the CRP. According to the Final
Report of the CAVR, "the prominence given to lisan within the CRP, including the element of official recognition had helped to restore its place as a
unifying force within communities. 5"
A similar critique applies to the recent efforts by the Ugandan government and the LRA to make practices like mato oput the cornerstone of
reconciliation in Northern Uganda. If successful, those efforts will result in
a transitional-justice institution that not only lacks democratic legitimacy,
but also reinforces a traditional legal system, ker kwaro Acholi, that tolerates
great evils against women:
According to tradition, women who change sexual partners are ostracized,
and often labelled a prostitute. This social norm can be so strong that it
sometimes means a woman may unite with a man who raped her, particularly if a child is born of the rape. It may also be one of the reasons why a
percentage of young women returning from the bush with children are
willing to reunite with their so called 'husbands' once they return....
"Some may wish to remarry ... but the child produced by rape is ostracized [by the husband, or the husband's family] and so these marriages
often fail."5
2. What Qualifies as a "Great Evil"?
This analysis, of course, begs a fundamental question: what justifies regarding the kinds of patriarchal practices tolerated by traditional legal
systems like Pashtunwali, lisan, and ker kwaro Acholi as "great evils"?
50.

Tanja Hohe & Rod Nixon, Reconciling Justice: 'Traditional' Law and State Judiciary in

East Timor 61 (Mar. 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
51.

CAVR Report, supra note 48, pt. 9,

52.

See Grenfell, supra note 49, at 320.

34.

53.

Waldorf, supra note 22, at 25-26.

54.

CAVR Report, supra note 48, pt. 9, 1 98.

55. Liu INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 43, at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting Interview with Margaret Tebere in Kanyagoga, Uganda (Feb. 23, 2005)).
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Drumbl's answer, which is far more cursory than one would hope, is simply
cosmopolitan pluralism, a theory that accepts "the richness of local identifications" while acknowledging "the universality of our shared membership
in a moral community that condemns great evil" (p. 20). But that response is
insufficient: although it is certainly true that all societies condemn certain
practices as great evils, they do not all condemn the same practices. Practices like genocide and discrimination-based crimes against humanity may
well be universally condemned, as Drumbl argues (p. 20). But those great
evils are departures from accepted social practices, not the accepted practices themselves, like the transfer of young women as compensation for
harm. Such practices cannot be considered universal evils, because they are
not universally condemned-and are, in fact, often widely accepted. So
what justifies labeling them "great evils"?
There are two possible answers. The first would be to insist that we cannot assume that a particular social practice is legitimate simply because it
exists. Given that all societies experience conflict over social norms-even
the most "traditional"-the existence of a particular practice in a society
may simply reflect the nonmajoritarian preferences and power of its political, military, economic, or religious elites. If so, the "acceptance" of that
practice should not disqualify it from being considered a great evil; indeed,
the fact that the practice only survives because of powerful partisan interests
may actually support the claim that it is one.
This is a powerful response, and one that Drumbl seems to embrace
when he writes that Pashtunwaliis "not a consensual project," but "emerges
from the diktat of patriarchal elites who serve as nonrepresentative religious
or military leaders" (p. 192). Unfortunately, it is far from clear whether
practices like Pashtunwali'stransfer of young women are as nonconsensual
as the response requires. I am not an expert in traditional legal systems, so I
am reluctant to offer a definitive conclusion. Nevertheless, there is reason to
be skeptical. Regarding Pashtunwali, for example, Drumbl offers no evidence in support of his claim that the transferred girls view their transfer as
"sexual violence and terror," and at least one expert has noted that although
it is difficult to understand why women
56 participate in Pashtunwali,they not
only do but actually resist reforming it.
The same can be said of the other troubling practices. The most comprehensive study of East Timorese women's attitudes toward traditional justice
found that, despite being critical of how men often administered lisan, they
uniformly believed that it was "a good system, that it should be respected
and that Timorese law should always be used in their search for justice. ' 7
Similarly, despite the fact that most Acholi are skeptical that ker kwaro practices like mato oput can end the conflict in Northern Uganda, the vast
56. See Palwasha Kakar, Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority 1-2
(2003) (unpublished research paper, Harvard University), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf.
57.
E.g., AISLING SWAINE, INT'L RESCUE COMM., TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND GENDER
BASED VIOLENCE 62 (2003), available at www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/otherresources/TJ
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majority-including women-continue to embrace the spiritual beliefs of
which ker kwaro Acholi is an integral part. 8
To be sure, it is always possible to argue that certain practices are evil
regardless of whether particular societies consensually accept them. That
position is not without its appeal: despite the fact that East Timorese women
accept a traditional justice system that says they will have to marry their
rapist if doing so will promote community harmony, many people are horrified by the practice and would happily see it eliminated.5 9
To say "many people" are horrified by lisan's compelled marriages,
however, is imprecise. What we really mean is that many Western people are
horrified by it. The call to eliminate forced marriages is ultimately a call to
impose Western values on the East Timorese-a fact that is not lost on the
Timorese themselves, who have dismissed attempts to bring lisan
t•
I•in line
,60
with international human rights standards as a "new form of colonialism."
That resistance does not necessarily mean human rights activists should give
up lobbying for a more Western view of women's autonomy. But it does
counsel caution regarding claims that a particular traditional practice is a
"great evil" that justifies international primacy over the national or local
practice. In the absence of such caution (and in hands less skilled than
Drumbl's), the "great evil" guideline could all too easily devolve into a
modem-day "repugnancy clause"-a colonial provision that incorporated
indigenous laws into colonial law only insofar as they did •not,,61
offend "civilized" notions of "natural justice, equity, and good conscience.
•

3. Why Can't We Accept "Great Evil" in the Name of Peace?
Even if we accept the idea that patriarchal practices like the transfer of
young women, compelled marriages, and the ostracizing of children borne
of rape qualify as "great evils," the qualified deference test fails to answer
another critical question: Might the ends justify the means? In other words,
is it wrong to accept such evils even if the traditional institutions of which
they are a part promote peace and reconciliation? Many traditional institutions that contain "great evils" have proven far more successful at both than
international tribunals. As noted earlier, for example, the use of lisan at the
CRP hearings was very successful, particularly compared to the internationalized SPSC. The SPSC managed to convict only 87 out of 440 indicted
suspects, largely because the international community was unwilling to put
pressure on Indonesia, where most of the indictees were located; 62 imposed
extremely lenient sentences, even on perpetrators convicted of extraordinary
international crimes (p. 58); and were widely criticized by ordinary East
58.
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59.

See Grenfell, supra note 49, at 320.

60.
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61.
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Timorese for prosecuting only low-level offenders.63 Should transitional justice in East Timor have been limited to the SPSC because lisan permits great
evils against women?
This "peace versus evil" question was posed even more starkly in postapartheid South Africa. Although the TRC might have promoted political
reconciliation, it did little to promote individual or community reconciliation. And the amnesty process was also not particularly successful: "almost
no high-ranking officials of the apartheid government came forward to ask
for amnesty, and the courts were largely unwilling to pursue cases, even
well-founded ones, against those who disdained the offer of amnesty for
truth."64
Traditional justice institutions in South Africa, by contrast, were much
more effective at promoting peace and reconciliation-particularly
neighborhood courts known as imbizo. After 1994, imbizo did much to prevent militant political activities from undermining the peace process, from
calling for curfews to urging youth to stop fighting the police. 65 And perhaps
even more important, they were a positive force for reconciliation between
the races. Consider, for example, the very different experiences of townships
that had an imbizo and those who did not:
[T]he urban court in Boipatong has dealt quite successfully with outstanding questions of the political conflicts of the past. It is no coincidence
that two former National Party members and councilors from 1988-90
have remained in their homes in the township, whereas other 'apartheid
collaborators' have been killed or chased away in other Vaal townships.
...This contrasts strongly with the situation in neighboring townships
without local courts such as Sharpeville, where no councilors have returned to their original homes, but are banished to shantytowns or special
barbed-wire enclosed camps constructed by the police. The existence of an
overarching justice institution in Boipatong, which can negotiate political
compromises and enforce retribution, has paradoxically created an environment less conducive to revenge killings. 66
Despite their many successes, however, there is no question that imbizo
would not be entitled to qualified deference. Imbizo were vicious retributive
mechanisms, prone to extracting confessions from suspects through torture
and subjecting convicted defendants to public beatings with whips and golf
clubs. 67 They even elevated such viciousness into an epistemological principle,
63.

Id. at 2.

64.
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Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The new landscape of traditional justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 5 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); see
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insisting that truth can only be established through physical violence. 6' Not
surprisingly, in keeping with their retributive epistemology, imbizo did not
provide defendants with even the rudiments of due process and mocked human rights organizations that insisted defendants be protected and given the
right to silence. 69 Finally, imbizo were deeply patriarchal, physically punish70
ing women and girls as young as fifteen found guilty of adultery.
What are we to make of a traditional institution like imbizo? It clearly
imposed great evils on both women and defendants-yet it also delivered
transitional justice at the individual and community levels far more effectively than the national TRC. Would its great evils have justified
international intervention, or would its successes have justified swallowing
hard and accepting them?
Although Drumbl never specifically answers this question, he does suggest that "[i]n cases of failure to meet the guidelines, internationalized
interventions should not replace in situ modalities, but, to the extent possible, work in tandem with local actors to develop harmonized structures that
respond to the shortcomings" (p. 190). That response, however, evades the
question. Of course we would hope that the international community would
try to reform a traditional institution before preempting it. But what if that is
not possible? It is difficult to see how imbizo could be harmonized with international human rights standards, and the Timorese angrily rejected
international criticism of lisan as a "new form of colonialism." What happens then?
B. HorizontalPluralization
Given the inability of individual criminal responsibility to address the
collective nature of mass atrocity, it is not difficult to be sympathetic to
Drumbl's desire to give collective sanctions-lustration, group tort liability,
group restitution, and the like-a try. There are, however, two basic problems with such sanctions. First, in order to be retributively just, they would
have to be imposed using the same liberal-legalist procedures that paralyze
international criminal trials. Second-and perhaps most important-only
retributively unjust collective sanctions can effectively deter mass atrocity.
1. Retribution
The critical issue with collective sanctions is, of course, how to define
the responsible group. Drumbl distinguishes between two different methods:
the crude way and the careful way. The crude way would define the group
on the basis of obvious sociological characteristics like nationality, ethnicity,
or religion, ignoring individual agency-holding all Germans responsible
for the Holocaust, for example, regardless of the role they played in it
68.

Id. at 207.

69.

See id. at 206.

70.

Id. at 215.

April 2008]

DeconstructingInternationalCriminal Law

(p. 197). The careful way, by contrast, would limit the group "to those individuals who, by virtue of their action or inaction, are demonstrably
responsible for atrocity," ensuring that "[i]ndividuals or entities for whom
no connection can affirmatively be delineated would avoid membership in
the sanctioned group" (p. 198).
If we follow Kant and define retributivism as the idea that "criminals
should be punished because they deserve it,"'7' the crude way of defining the
collectively sanctioned group would obviously be retributively unjust. As
Drumbl notes, by ignoring individual agency in favor of sociological characteristics, the crude way would "include individuals who are not personally
responsible," even those who were powerless to help prevent mass atrocity
or actively opposed it, as long as "the atrocity was committed in their collective name" (p. 197). An excellent example of such injustice is
Czechoslovakia's post-Velvet Revolution lustration law, which prohibited
anyone who was an official of, or a collaborator with, the Communist Party
from holding public employment. The law did not require the government to
prove that an individual had been involved in human rights violations; it
only had to produce records held by the secret police that indicated he or she
had been a communist official or collaborator.72 The law thus sanctioned
three categories of individuals who were not responsible for the evils of the
communist regime: those who had agreed to collaborate but never produced
any usable information; 73 those who had only collaborated because they
"were coerced into it through blackmail or threats of persecution of family
members"; 74 and-most unfortunate of all-those who were, because of
unreliable and deliberately falsified police records, identified as collaborators despite having refused to collaborate.75
The crude way of defining a responsible group would not only be overinclusive. It would also usually be underinclusive, failing to sanction
individuals who were personally responsible for atrocities but did not possess the defining characteristic of the sanctioned group. The first stage of
denazification after World War II, for example, dismissed individuals from
office on the basis of various crudely defined categories: their rank or position in the Nazi party or one of its organizations; their prominence during
the war in the economic, cultural, or social fields; and so on. Such "overmechanical" standards meant that numerous individuals "who had played an
important r6le under the Nazis could escape the purge because, for one reason or another, they did not fall in one of the categories. '7

71.

This is Drumbl's paraphrase. P. 150.

72. Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of Transitional Justice, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357, 378 (1999).
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Two other drawbacks to the crude way are worth mentioning. First, by
sanctioning all of the members of a responsible group regardless of their
individual responsibility, the crude way would run the risk of mitigating the
guilt of those who actually were most responsible for the atrocities-the7 7
no one is.
idea being, to quote Hannah Arendt, that "where all are guilty,

George Fletcher, for example, has admitted to being "very much drawn to
the idea that the guilt of the German nation as a whole should mitigate the
guilt of particular criminals like Eichmann, who is guilty to be sure, but
guilty like so many others of a collective crime.,,78 Fletcher immediately
qualifies that statement by acknowledging that an individual perpetrator's
guilt might still be "sufficiently grave to justify severe punishment, ' 79 but it
is precisely that kind of individualized determination that the crude way
would not provide.
Second, because they would be retributively unjust, crudely imposed
collective sanctions would likely alienate the group against whom they are
imposed, reducing-if not eliminating-their ability to promote reconciliation. "[P]unishment perceived to be unjust has the effect of increasing the
solidarity and resentment of those who suffer and, ultimately, the effect of
augmenting resistance rather than decreasing it."5' Such was certainly the
fate of the U.S. war crimes program after World War II: because most
Germans viewed the program as little more than collective punishment for
the sins of a select few, the program did almost nothing to re-educate or democratize them, generating instead intense anti-Allied sentiment."
These drawbacks could be avoided, of course, by defining the responsible group carefully instead of crudely-"limit[ing] the group to those
individuals who, by virtue of their action or inaction, are demonstrably responsible for atrocity" (p. 198). That was Vaclav Havel's position on
Czechoslovakia's lustration law: he proposed minimizing the law's "collective guilt" by "providing an objective, impartial hearing in each case., 82 The
careful way would obviously be far more retributively just, yet it has a fatal
flaw as a procedural mechanism for addressing mass atrocity: the individu-
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21 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2003).

78. George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
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alized hearings it requires would be procedurally indistinguishable from
83
liberal-legalist criminal trials-a fact Drumbl basically recognizes.
Because the careful way would require the same liberal-legalist procedures as the individualized criminal trial, it would be no better suited for
remedying and deterring mass atrocity. Most obviously, the careful way
would be completely impractical: given the large number of individuals who
could conceivably be part of the group responsible for the atrocitiesparticularly if it includes all bystanders who did not actively work to prevent
them, as Drumbl proposes-providing them all with "an objective, impartial
hearing" would take decades. In Rwanda, for example, the International
Committee of the Red Cross estimates that approximately 89,000 remain
detained on genocide-related charges'-likely a conservative estimate,
given that the Rwandan government wants to try between 760,000 and
1,000,000 people in gacacacourts for involvement in the 1994 genocide (p.
91). Holding that number of trials will be nearly impossible even in the
gacaca courts, which accelerate the process by denying defendants even the
rudiments of due process. In the context of a retributively just trial or hearing, it would be literally unthinkable-something the United States learned
the hard way when it responded to German criticisms of denazification by
introducing liberal-legalist hearings for the accused." Although the hearings
(which were conducted by the Germans themselves) somewhat quelled the
criticism, they did so largely through their
•- 86 spectacular failure to find defendants responsible for the Nazis' atrocities.
Drumbl himself, it is important to note, does not embrace either the
crude way or the careful way. Instead, he defends a middle path in which
"the group can be defined crudely, with the subsequent opportunity for
group members to affirmatively demonstrate why they should be excluded
from the liable group" (p. 204).
The crude-careful way, however, seems no more workable than the careful way. Although perhaps not requiring quite as much liberal-legalist
procedure, an individualized hearing in which the burden of proof is on the
defendant is still an individualized hearing. The defendant would still have
to be allowed to obtain evidence (such as Czech secret-police records) from
the authorities, to test its authenticity, and to call witnesses on his behalfevidence that the prosecution would then have to challenge. Moreover, that
defendant would have every incentive to put on the most elaborate and timeconsuming defense possible: unlike an ordinary criminal defendant, he
would not be able to argue that the prosecution's evidence was not strong
enough to satisfy the burden of proof.

83. See p. 198 ("The careful way thereby abides by Western legalist assumptions of causation and individual agency.").
84. William A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J.
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The crude-careful way would also be much more likely to be retributively unjust than the careful way-and thus far more likely to alienate the
"responsible" group. There is an important but deceptive asymmetry between normal and reversed burdens of proof in situations involving mass
atrocity: when the prosecution bears the burden of proof, it would need to
prove only that the defendant was involved in one act of group atrocity; but
when the defendant bears the burden of proof, he would have to prove that
he did not commit any of the group atrocities. Absent being able to prove
that he was nowhere near the scene of each atrocity-and perhaps not even
then, given aspatial theories of liability like joint criminal enterprise and
command responsibility-how could a defendant satisfy that burden?
This critique, moreover, assumes that the defendant was actually a
member of the responsible group. How would a defendant disprove that assumption? Consider the plight of the "dead souls" in postcommunist
Czechoslovakia-individuals who were identified in secret-police records as
collaborators even though they had never been approached for collaboration." How would a dead soul prove that he had not collaborated with the
secret police if he bore the burden of proving his nonmembership? After all,
his name was right there in the records.
2. Deterrence
There is also reason to question Drumbl's belief that the threat of collective sanctions would encourage bystanders to control conflict entrepreneurs
early on, before they are able to "inflame and exacerbate communal tensions" to the point of mass violence (p. 202). Unfortunately, only
retributively unjust sanctions would provide bystanders sufficient encouragement.
To see why, I must first quibble with Drumbl's understanding of deterrence. As noted earlier, he believes deterrence is a function of the likelihood
that an individual would be sanctioned and the speed with which sanctions
would be imposed (p. 170). That formulation is idiosyncratic; most criminologists hold that deterrence is a function of the likelihood of prosecution
and the severity of punishment if convicted."' If the traditional formulation is
correct, the deterrent value of collective sanctions for bystanders would depend on two factors: the likelihood that they would be held responsible for
not preventing mass atrocity, and the severity of the sanctions they would
suffer if collective sanctions were actually imposed upon them.
In terms of the likelihood of sanction, the careful way would have almost no deterrent value. Drumbl acknowledges that bystanders who benefit
from atrocity are less blameworthy than those who personally commit it: the
conflict entrepreneurs, the mid-level officials, and the actual killers (p. 25).
It is thus reasonable to assume that all of those perpetrators would be criminally prosecuted before bystanders would be civilly prosecuted. But if that
87.

Boed, supra note 72, at 381.

88.
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is true, then the threat of even the most draconian collective sanctions would
provide bystanders with no incentive not to "draw their blinds and look
away" (p. 25); no justice system could prosecute all of the perpetrators who
actually committed atrocities, much less those perpetrators and all of the
bystanders who allowed the atrocities to happen.
The crude way, by contrast, would have maximum deterrent value. Because it would sanction all of the members of a particular group regardless
of their individual agency, the only question bystanders could have about
being sanctioned would be whether they would be deemed members of the
sanctioned group. That inquiry should be easy for bystanders to answer,
however, given that that the crude way simply determines the responsible
group "along its most evident characteristics," such as nationality, ethnicity,
or party membership (p. 197).
The crude-careful way would have almost as much deterrent value as the
crude way. Bystanders who were members of the responsible group could
only escape being sanctioned by proving that they tried to prevent the atrocities. As we have seen, though, few if any bystanders will be able to do so.
Most bystanders, therefore, would have every reason to expect being sanctioned for their group membership.
Because both the crude way and the crude-careful way make sanctions
overwhelmingly likely for bystanders, the real question is how severe those
sanctions would have to be to motivate bystanders ex ante to try to prevent
those atrocities. There is no question that sufficiently motivating sanctions
are possible, 9 such as bulldozing all of the houses in a village that produced
a suicide bomber.90 The issue is whether sanctions that we would consider
9
retributively just-i.e., proportionate to the gravity of the offense g-would
also work.
Regrettably, it seems unlikely. First, the sanctions would have to be sufficiently onerous to encourage bystanders not only to avoid participating in
atrocities-even passive bystanders are subject to collective sanctions, in
Drumbl's view-but also to actively try to prevent them. Such activities could
expose bystanders to considerable personal danger, particularly in nondemocratic societies where opposition would have to go beyond the ballot box.
89. It is worth nothing, however, that although the crude way could encourage bystanders to
prevent mass atrocity, it could not provide them with any incentive to limit atrocities once they began. Bystanders would have an incentive to prevent their group from committing atrocities because,
once committed, they could do nothing to escape being sanctioned for them. For the same reason,
however, they would have no reason to limit atrocities once they began, because the crude way
would sanction even those who opposed the atrocities "committed in their collective name." The
careful-crude way, by contrast, would not have the same limitation, because bystanders would at
least have the opportunity to avoid collective sanctions by proving that they tried to prevent the
atrocities.
90. This example is Alan Dershowitz's proposal for how Israel should respond to Palestinian
suicide bombers. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 177 (2002).

91.
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Second, the sanctions would also have to take into account that it is much
more difficult to deter others from acting in ways they find "morally justifiable and perhaps even necessary" (p. 171). Drumbl is speaking about actual
killers, the same holds true for the many bystanders who "benefit ideologically and politically from the atrocity" (p. 25).
It is difficult to argue that it would be retributively just to impose such
sanctions on bystanders, even if we acknowledge that they are at least partially responsible for atrocity. As Drumbl notes, bystanders are less
responsible than the conflict entrepreneurs, mid-level officials, and actual
killers. They would thus obviously deserve lighter sanctions-especially
given that we do not normally consider failing to act to be as culpable as
acting. Moreover, bystanders who simply pull the blinds and look away are
even less responsible than bystanders who do not participate in atrocities but
benefit indirectly from them, such as the German who moves into the deported Jew's empty apartment. It would thus be even more difficult to justify
imposing severe sanctions on bystanders who do not benefit from the atrocity.
Again, nothing in this analysis indicates that it would be impossible for
the crude way or the crude-careful way to coerce bystanders into trying to
prevent mass atrocity. But it would not be just-particularly given that neither the crude way nor the careful-crude way could justly determine who
was a member of the collectively sanctioned group.
CONCLUSION

Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law provides a damning critique of the transformative potential of international criminal law. It is hard
to imagine that anyone who reads the book will still be able to believe that
liberal-legalist criminal trials, however well-intentioned, are capable of dealing with the collective nature of mass atrocity. Drumbl is absolutely right: a
"richly multivalent approach" to transitional justice is needed (p. 181)-one
in which international criminal law plays a far more modest role than it has
hitherto. His call to experiment with new kinds of transitional-justice institutions is thus both long overdue and most welcome.
That said, we should not let our skepticism of the international make us
unduly credulous of the national. If the problems with Drumbl's proposal
for qualified deference indicate anything, it is that national transitionaljustice institutions are no more likely to deliver justice than international
ones. Unfortunately, although states often speak the language of reconciliation, their rhetoric all too often conceals far more partisan-and far less
conciliatory-political goals. Rwanda's deliberate use of gacaca as a "tool
of social control" is just one of many possible examples. Moreover, states
are not neutral actors at the international level, but actively attempt to use
international institutions whenever possible for their own partisan ends. The
Ugandan government's (ultimately failed) attempt to use a self-referral to
the ICC as a weapon against the LRA is an example (p. 144). And even
more revealing is the fact that, as I have explained elsewhere, the states that
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created the ICC made sure that the absence of due process in a domestic
criminal prosecution would not make a case admissible before the ICC. 92
Similarly, we must also remember that national transitional-justice
mechanisms can be both pluralizing and homogenizing: pluralizing relative
to international criminal law, and homogenizing relative to traditional forms
of justice. "Official" state law has always been hostile to indigenous law,93
and transitional justice is no different-even when that hostility is counterproductive. South Africa's TRC did everything it could to eliminate imbizo,
despite their success at keeping the peace; Sierra Leone's TRC ignored traditional religious leaders and local forgiveness rituals, crippling its ability to
promote reconciliation.94 To be sure, traditional forms of justice often involve practices that seem-at least from a Western perspective-to inflict
great evils on innocent parties. Nevertheless, to refuse to even consider trading autonomy and equality for peace is no more defensible than insisting
that it is always wrong to trade justice for peace.
Finally, we must not permit our frustration with "ordinary" remedies for
mass atrocity to blind us to the perils of collective responsibility. Collective
sanctions may be effective, but they cannot be just if they sever the relationship between an individual's responsibility and the magnitude of his crime.

92. See Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of
the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CiuM. L.F. 255, 258-59 (2006).
93. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Sorting Out PopularJustice, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPUJUSTICE 31, 31-32 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993) ("Popular justice established
in opposition to the state tends to die out or be colonized by state law .....
LAR

94.

Waldorf, supra note 22, at 23.
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